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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
Appellant Matthew Faush is an African-American 
employee of Labor Ready, a staffing firm that provides 
temporary employees to several clients, including Appellee 
Tuesday Morning, Inc. According to Faush, Labor Ready 
assigned him to work at one of Tuesday Morning’s stores, 
where he was subjected to racial slurs and racially motivated 
accusations and was eventually terminated.  
 
Faush filed suit against Tuesday Morning, claiming 
violations of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act, among other statutes. The District Court granted 
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summary judgment to Tuesday Morning on the ground that, 
because Faush was not Tuesday Morning’s employee, 
Tuesday Morning could not be liable for employment 
discrimination. Because a rational jury applying the factors 
announced by the Supreme Court in Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Darden could find on these facts that Faush 
was Tuesday Morning’s employee for purposes of Title VII 
and the Human Relations Act, we vacate in part the grant of 
summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
A. The Underlying Dispute 
 
 Matthew Faush was employed by Labor Ready, a 
staffing firm that provides temporary employees to a number 
of clients, including closeout home-goods retailer Tuesday 
Morning, Inc. Over the course of a month, Labor Ready sent 
temporary employees to a new Tuesday Morning store in 
Pennsylvania overseen by store manager Keith Davis. The 
temporary employees were asked to unload merchandise, set 
up display shelves, and stock merchandise on the shelves in 
preparation for the store’s opening the following month. 
Faush was assigned to the store for ten days; each day, he 
generally worked for eight hours with nine other temporary 
employees.  
 
 Faush alleges in his complaint that when he and other 
African-American temporary employees were working at the 
Tuesday Morning store, Davis accused them of stealing two 
eyeliner pens, insisting that “[his] people wouldn’t do that.” 
(App. 30 ¶ 18.) A few days later, the store owner’s mother 
told Faush and two other African-American temporary 
employees to work in the back of the store with the garbage 
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until it was time to leave. When Faush and his coworkers 
went to speak with Davis, a white employee blocked their 
path and referred to them using a racial slur. Davis refused to 
hear their complaints regarding the slur. Instead, he informed 
them that he would not let them on the floor because an alarm 
had been triggered and he was concerned about loss 
prevention. Faush alleges that he and his African-American 
coworkers were “terminated,” but his complaint provides no 
further detail. (App. 31 ¶ 34.) 
 
 Faush filed suit against Tuesday Morning in federal 
court for racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The parties conducted limited 
discovery on the threshold issue of whether Faush could be 
considered Tuesday Morning’s employee. Tuesday Morning 
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that it had never employed Faush or entered into a 
contract with him, as is a predicate for his various claims.  
 
B. The Summary Judgment Evidence 
 
 Labor Ready assigned Faush to work at a Tuesday 
Morning store under an “Agreement to Supply Temporary 
Employees” (the “Agreement”) between Labor Ready and 
Tuesday Morning. (App. 55.) There was no contract between 
Faush and Tuesday Morning, and Faush never formally 
applied for employment at the store.  
 
 Labor Ready provided the temporary employees with 
time cards on which they recorded the amount of time they 
spent working at Tuesday Morning. Under the Agreement, 
Tuesday Morning was expected to “approve [the] time card 
for each [temporary employee], or otherwise accurately report 
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the daily hours worked.” (App. 56 ¶ 2(a).) Accordingly, at the 
end of each day, Davis signed a document indicating how 
many hours each temporary employee had worked. Labor 
Ready billed Tuesday Morning $13.52 per hour of work plus 
tax.  
 
 If a temporary employee was unable to report to work 
at the store, he or she was expected to inform Labor Ready 
rather than Tuesday Morning. Once a temporary employee 
was at the store, however, the Agreement provided that 
Tuesday Morning was “responsible for supervising and 
directing [his or her] activities.” (App. 55, 56 ¶ 4(a).) Tuesday 
Morning acknowledged that Labor Ready was “not a licensed 
general contractor or subcontractor,” was not responsible for 
Tuesday Morning’s project, and would “not be providing 
supervision services for its [temporary employees].” (App. 
55, 56 ¶ 4(a)-(b).) Indeed, Tuesday Morning was required to 
provide any necessary “site specific safety orientation and 
training,” as well as any “Personal Protective Equipment, 
clothing, or devices necessary for any work to be performed.” 
(App. 56 ¶ 3(a).)  
 
 Tuesday Morning was expected to determine whether 
the temporary employees met its “skill, competency, license, 
experience, or other requirements, and only assign [them] 
duties consistent with their skills and abilities.” (App. 56 ¶ 
2(d).) The Agreement did not permit Tuesday Morning to 
“entrust [temporary employees] with the care of unattended 
premises, custody or control of cash, credit cards, valuables 
or other similar property,” or to “allow [temporary 
employees] to operate machinery, equipment or motor 
vehicles without [Labor Ready’s] prior written permission.” 
(App. 56 ¶ 4(c).) 
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 Davis, the Tuesday Morning store manager, testified at 
his deposition that he had “supervisory control over the 
temporary employees,” trained them to assemble shelves, and 
“assigned them tasks to perform on a daily basis.” (App. 101, 
104.) Significantly, the work they were assigned was no 
different from the work Davis assigned to his own employees. 
Davis further testified that the temporary employees were “a 
stop[gap] measure” because his store was “brand new” and 
did not yet have “a full compl[e]ment of Tuesday Morning 
employees.” (App. 104.)  
 
 A Labor Ready supervisor did visit the store on two 
occasions. On her first visit, she ensured that the temporary 
employees were moving at an acceptable pace, but the tasks 
were assigned by Davis, and the Labor Ready supervisor 
passed Davis’s instructions on to the temporary employees. 
On the second visit, she simply verified that all of the 
temporary employees were present.  
 
 None of the temporary employees was provided with a 
key to the store. At his deposition, however, Davis referred to 
the “assistant managers of the store” as his “key holders.” 
(App. 101.) Presumably, then, not every permanent employee 
at Tuesday Morning was provided with a key.  
 
 Pursuant to the Agreement, if Tuesday Morning was 
“unhappy with any [temporary employee] for any reason,” it 
could inform Labor Ready “within the first two (2) hours,” 
and Labor Ready would “send out a replacement 
immediately.” (App. 55.) Davis testified that Tuesday 
Morning regional manager Kathy Beromeo had the authority 
to request that a temporary employee not be allowed to return 
to the store; however, to his knowledge, this never occurred. 
Tuesday Morning had no authority to terminate a temporary 
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employee’s employment with Labor Ready, although the 
record is silent as to what, if any, other temporary 
employment would be made available to a temporary 
employee by Labor Ready if that employee were rejected by 
Tuesday Morning. And after Faush ended his work at the 
store, Tuesday Morning never received any claim for 
unemployment compensation benefits.  
 
 Labor Ready set the temporary employees’ pay rate; 
paid their wages, taxes, and social security; maintained 
workers’ compensation insurance on their behalf; and 
completed their I-9 employment eligibility verification forms. 
Tuesday Morning, on the other hand, never had Faush’s 
social security number.  
 
 In certain respects, however, Tuesday Morning shared 
responsibility for the wages paid to the temporary employees. 
As explained above, Tuesday Morning paid Labor Ready for 
each hour worked by each temporary employee. The 
Agreement provided that Labor Ready could adjust the rates 
charged to Tuesday Morning to reflect increases in its “actual 
or government mandated cost for wages, withholding 
amounts, governmental taxes, assessments, health care, [and] 
Workers’ Compensation insurance.” (App. 55, 56 ¶ 2(f).) 
Tuesday Morning could also be required to “pay overtime 
charges as applicable to overtime paid according to law.” 
(App. 56 ¶ 2(b).) Moreover, the Agreement required Tuesday 
Morning to notify Labor Ready “if a prevailing wage, living 
wage, or any other government mandated minimum statutory 
wage should be paid to [temporary employees]” and did not 
“relieve[] [Tuesday Morning] of its primary responsibility for 
ensuring complete and accurate compliance with all local, 
state, and federal laws relating to prevailing wages.” (App. 56 
¶ 3(c).) 
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 Finally, the Agreement required both Labor Ready and 
Tuesday Morning to “comply with all applicable federal, state 
and local laws and regulations concerning employment, 
including but not limited to: wage and hour, breaks and meal 
period regulations, the hiring and discharge of employees, 
Title VII and the FLSA.” (App. 56 ¶ 3(b).) Moreover, both 
companies pledged to “provide a workplace free from 
discrimination and unfair labor practices.” (Id.)  
 
C. The Decision of the District Court 
 
 The District Court granted Tuesday Morning’s motion 
for summary judgment. Weighing the factors relevant to the 
existence of an employment relationship, it held that Tuesday 
Morning was not Faush’s employer and, consequently, could 
not be liable under Title VII or the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act.1 The District Court further held that Faush 
could not pursue his § 1981 claim because he had not 
attempted to enter into any contract with Tuesday Morning. 
Faush filed a timely notice of appeal.2 
                                              
1 The District Court, in the absence of precedential authority 
within this Circuit, understandably relied on three non-
precedential opinions in reaching its conclusion.  Aside from 
their non-precedential status, however, those cases involved 
pro se plaintiffs who presented virtually no evidence in 
opposition to summary judgment and thus are readily 
distinguishable. 
2 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s final order granting summary judgment pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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II. Discussion 
 
 We first address Faush’s claims under Title VII and 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, then his claim under 
§ 1981.  
 
A. Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act 
 
 1. The necessity of an employment relationship 
 
 Title VII forbids, among other things, “status-based 
discrimination by employers, employment agencies, labor 
organizations, and training programs.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. 
Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2530 (2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)-(d)). Faush alleges that Tuesday Morning was 
his “employer” and discriminated against him on the basis of 
race. Accordingly, in order to prevail on his Title VII claim, 
he must demonstrate the existence of an “employment 
relationship” with Tuesday Morning. Covington v. Int’l Ass’n 
of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 
2013).3  
                                              
3 Certain Courts of Appeals have held that a defendant may 
be liable for interfering with employment opportunities even 
if that defendant is not the plaintiff’s employer, while others 
reject this theory of liability. See Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. 
Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 373-76 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing Sibley 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and 
collecting cases from other circuits). As Faush does not argue 
that Tuesday Morning is liable on this basis, we need not 
consider this possibility. 
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 Claims brought under the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et seq., are generally 
“‘interpreted coextensively with Title VII claims.’” Brown v. 
J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 179 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2006)). Although the Act protects certain limited categories 
of independent contractors that Title VII does not, see id. at 
179 n.1, Faush does not invoke these protections or dispute 
that he must demonstrate an employment relationship to 
prevail on his state-law claim.  
 
 2. The Enterprise test versus the Darden test 
 
 The parties dispute the appropriate test for an 
employment relationship. Faush argues that the test for “joint 
employers” articulated in In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage 
& Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012), 
should apply in this context. Tuesday Morning argues that the 
test announced in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 
U.S. 318 (1992), applies instead. Both parties contend that 
they win regardless of which multi-factor test applies, and the 
two tests are indeed quite similar. As a doctrinal matter, 
however, it is clear that the Darden test applies to Title VII 
cases, while the Enterprise test does not.  
 
 In Darden, the Supreme Court was called upon to 
construe the term “employee” in the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Because the definition of 
“employee” in ERISA “is completely circular and explains 
nothing,” Darden, 503 U.S. at 323, the Court concluded, as it 
had in similar situations, “‘that Congress intended to describe 
the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by 
common-law agency doctrine,’” id. at 322-23 (quoting Cmty. 
11 
 
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 
(1989)). Because Title VII’s definition of “employee” is 
similarly devoid of content, the common-law test outlined in 
Darden governs in the Title VII context as well. See Walters 
v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1997); 
Covington, 710 F.3d at 119; Brown, 581 F.3d at 180.4  
                                              
4 One of our cases appears, at first glance, to complicate the 
picture. In Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723 (3d Cir. 1997), we 
considered whether clerks who were formally employed by 
the judicial branch of Pennsylvania could also pursue Title 
VII claims against the county in which their court sat. We 
reasoned that although “the courts are considered the 
employers of judicial personnel[,] . . . this fact does not 
preclude the possibility that a county may share co-employer 
or joint employer status with the courts[] . . . [if both] entities 
exercise significant control over the same employees.” Id. at 
727. Rather than expressly considering the Darden factors, 
we drew guidance from cases assessing “joint-employer 
status” in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, 
and we concluded that the clerks had sufficiently alleged that 
the judicial branch had “delegate[d] employer-type 
responsibilities to [the] county.” Id. The factors considered 
for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act are, 
however, essentially the same as those listed in Darden. See 
N.L.R.B. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 
1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. 
N.L.R.B., 879 F.2d 1526, 1531 (7th Cir. 1989). This is 
because the word “employee” in the National Labor Relations 
Act, as in ERISA and Title VII, is intended to convey the 
common-law meaning of the term. See N.L.R.B. v. Town & 
Country Elec., Inc. 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995); Darden, 503 U.S. 
at 324-35. 
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 The Enterprise test, by contrast, applies “[w]hen 
determining whether someone is an employee under the [Fair 
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)].” Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 
467. The definition of “employee” in the FLSA is of “striking 
breadth” and “cover[s] some parties who might not qualify as 
such under a strict application of traditional agency law 
principles.” Darden, 503 U.S. at 326. Accordingly, the 
“textual asymmetry” between Title VII and the FLSA 
“precludes reliance on FLSA cases.” Id. Instead, the sole 
question before us is whether the common law of agency 
would recognize a master-servant relationship.5 
 
 3. The inquiry under Darden  
 
 “‘In determining whether a hired party is an employee 
under the general common law of agency, we consider the 
hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which 
the product is accomplished.’” Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 
(quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751). Darden provides a non-
exhaustive list of relevant factors, including 
“the skill required; the source of the 
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the 
work; the duration of the relationship between 
the parties; whether the hiring party has the 
right to assign additional projects to the hired 
                                              
5 The Fourth Circuit recently adopted a “hybrid test” for joint 
employment in the Title VII context that incorporates both the 
common law of agency and the “economic realities test” used 
in FLSA cases. See Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 
793 F.3d 404, 413-14 (4th Cir. 2015). This test is very similar 
to the Darden test, however, and we see no reason to apply it 
instead of Darden. 
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party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion 
over when and how long to work; the method of 
payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and 
paying assistants; whether the work is part of 
the regular business of the hiring party; whether 
the hiring party is in business; the provision of 
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the 
hired party.”  
Id. at 323-24 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52). 
 
 Our Court has generally focused on “‘which entity 
paid [the employees’] salaries, hired and fired them, and had 
control over their daily employment activities.’” Covington, 
710 F.3d at 119 (alteration in original) (quoting Covington v. 
Int’l Ass’n of Approved Basketball Officials, No. 08-3639, 
2010 WL 3404977, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2010)). However, 
“[s]ince the common-law test contains ‘no shorthand formula 
or magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, . . . all 
of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and 
weighed with no one factor being decisive.’” Darden, 503 
U.S. at 324 (second alteration in original) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. 
United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).6  
                                              
6 As mentioned above, the Enterprise test is extremely similar 
to the Darden test. It considers  
1) the alleged employer’s authority to hire and 
fire the relevant employees; 2) the alleged 
employer’s authority to promulgate work rules 
and assignments and to set the employees’ 
conditions of employment: compensation, 
benefits, and work schedules, including the rate 
and method of payment; 3) the alleged 
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 The Darden factors assist in “drawing a line between 
independent contractors and employees” hired by a given 
entity. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 
538 U.S. 440, 445 n.5 (2003). Significantly, the inquiry under 
Darden is not which of two entities should be considered the 
employer of the person in question. Two entities may be “co-
employers” or “joint employers” of one employee for 
purposes of Title VII. Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 727 
(3d Cir. 1997). Indeed, at common law, one could be a “dual 
servant acting for two masters simultaneously” or a 
“borrowed servant” who by virtue of being “‘directed or 
permitted by his master to perform services for another may 
become the servant of such other.’” Williamson v. Consol. 
Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1349 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 227 (1958)).  
 
 4. Standard of review 
 
 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same standard as the District Court. Renchenski 
v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 324 (3d Cir. 2010). “Summary 
judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
                                                                                                     
employer’s involvement in day-to-day 
employee supervision, including employee 
discipline; and 4) the alleged employer’s actual 
control of employee records, such as payroll, 
insurance, or taxes.  
Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 469. As with the Darden test, this list 
of factors is “not exhaustive,” and “other indicia of 
‘significant control’” may “suggest that a given employer was 
a joint employer of an employee.” Id. at 469-70. 
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matter of law.” Massie v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
620 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)).  
 “When a legal standard requires the balancing of 
multiple factors, as it does in this case, summary judgment 
may still be appropriate even if not all of the factors favor one 
party,” so long as the evidence “so favors” the movant that 
“no reasonable juror” could render a verdict against it. 
Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 471; see also Brown, 581 F.3d at 180-
81; In re APA Transp. Corp. Consol. Litig., 541 F.3d 233, 
245 n.10 (3d Cir. 2008). The question of whether Tuesday 
Morning was Faush’s employer must be left to the jury if, on 
the other hand, reasonable minds could come to different 
conclusions on the issue. See Graves, 117 F.3d at 729; 
Williamson, 926 F.2d at 1348.  
 
 5. Faush’s relationship with Tuesday Morning 
 
 The evidence marshaled by Faush is more than 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. A rational jury 
applying the Darden factors could find that Faush and 
Tuesday Morning had a common-law employment 
relationship and, therefore, that Faush was Tuesday 
Morning’s employee for purposes of Title VII and the Human 
Relations Act. 
 
 First, the District Court overstated the extent to which 
the factors pertaining to compensation cut against Faush. 
While Labor Ready did set the temporary employees’ pay 
rate; paid their wages, taxes, and social security; and 
maintained workers’ compensation insurance on their behalf, 
Tuesday Morning also bore certain responsibilities with 
respect to the temporary employees’ wages. It was obligated 
under the Agreement to notify Labor Ready if any 
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“government mandated minimum statutory wage” should be 
paid to temporary employees, and it retained its “primary 
responsibility” for ensuring compliance with prevailing-wage 
laws. (App. 56 ¶ 3(c).) And Tuesday Morning was in the best 
position to evaluate compliance with labor laws because the 
temporary employees were similarly situated to Tuesday 
Morning’s permanent employees.  
 
 Moreover, although Tuesday Morning made its 
payments to Labor Ready, rather than to the temporary 
employees, those payments were functionally 
indistinguishable from direct employee compensation. That 
is, rather than paying Labor Ready a fixed rate for the 
completion of a discrete project, “‘a method by which 
independent contractors are often compensated’” Reid, 490 
U.S. at 752 (quoting Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532, 
1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987)), Tuesday Morning paid Labor Ready 
for each hour worked by each individual temporary employee 
at an agreed-upon hourly rate and was even obligated under 
the Agreement to pay any overtime charges required by law. 
Tuesday Morning was also required to pay any changes in the 
rates stemming from increases in Labor Ready’s costs from 
wages, taxes, and insurance. Essentially, Tuesday Morning 
indirectly paid the temporary employees’ wages, plus a fee to 
Labor Ready for its administrative services.  
 
 Similarly, the factors pertaining to hiring and firing 
provide only weak support for Tuesday Morning’s position. 
To be sure, Labor Ready was the entity that hired Faush and 
dispatched him to the Tuesday Morning store. Tuesday 
Morning obviously did not have the power to terminate 
Faush’s employment with Labor Ready or any obligation to 
pay him unemployment benefits. Tuesday Morning did, 
however, have ultimate control over whether Faush was 
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permitted to work at its store. If Tuesday Morning was 
unhappy with any temporary employee for any reason, it had 
the power to demand a replacement from Labor Ready and to 
prevent the ejected employee from returning to the store. 
Nothing in the record suggests that Labor Ready had any 
policy or practice, much less obligation, to continue to pay a 
temporary employee who was not then on a temporary 
assignment or to provide an immediate alternative assignment 
for an employee turned away from a job. See Ruehl v. 
Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 372, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (when 
determining whether there is any genuine issue of material 
fact, we are required to “draw[] all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party”). 
 
 Finally, Tuesday Morning’s control over the temporary 
employees’ daily activities overwhelmingly favors Faush.7 
Faush worked at a Tuesday Morning store, rather than at a 
remote site controlled by Labor Ready. Admittedly, it was of 
no concern to Tuesday Morning whether Faush reported to 
the store or whether another temporary employee showed up 
in his place. Once he was there, however, Tuesday Morning 
personnel gave Faush assignments, directly supervised him, 
provided site-specific training, furnished any equipment and 
materials necessary, and verified the number of hours he 
worked on a daily basis. In fact, the only time a Labor Ready 
                                              
7 The relevant factors mentioned in Darden include “‘the skill 
required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the 
location of the work; . . . whether the hiring party has the 
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; [and] the 
extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long 
to work.’” Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24 (quoting Reid, 490 
U.S. at 751). 
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supervisor visited the store and participated in the work, she 
merely relayed instructions from the Tuesday Morning 
manager to the Labor Ready employees, and did not, herself, 
exercise any supervisory functions over the Labor Ready 
employees. Thus, unlike a contractor relationship, in which an 
agency is hired to perform a discrete task and oversees its 
employees’ work in the completion of that project, the Labor 
Ready employees were hired on an hourly basis to perform 
services under the supervision of Tuesday Morning 
management, which exercised control over the temporary 
employees’ daily work activities. And although the Labor 
Ready temporary employees worked at the store for a more 
limited period, Tuesday Morning managed them in the same 
way it managed its permanent employees. 
 
 Also unlike a contractor relationship, the Labor Ready 
employees were not hired for any specialized skillset: They 
were merely “a stop[gap] measure” because the store was 
“brand new” and did not yet have “a full compl[e]ment of 
Tuesday Morning employees.” (App. 104.) The Labor Ready 
employees, under the direct supervision of Tuesday Morning 
management, performed only unskilled tasks, such as 
unloading and stocking merchandise, setting up display 
shelves, and removing garbage. While it is true that the 
Agreement precluded Tuesday Morning from entrusting any 
temporary employee with unattended premises, valuables, 
machinery, or vehicles, the tasks assigned to the Labor Ready 
employees, according to the testimony of a Tuesday Morning 
manager, were no different than those assigned to Tuesday 
Morning employees.   
 
  Although not dispositive, the fact that Labor Ready 
and Tuesday Morning characterized Faush, and the other 
workers supplied, as “Temporary Employees,” rather than 
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independent contractors also bolsters Faush’s position. See 
Brown, 581 F.3d at 181 (considering the fact that the parties’ 
agreement labeled the plaintiff an “independent contractor”); 
(App. 55 (emphasis added)). In the Agreement, Labor Ready 
expressly disavowed the notion that it was a “licensed general 
contractor or subcontractor.” (Id.) Most significantly, 
Tuesday Morning pledged to “provide a workplace free from 
discrimination and unfair labor practices” and to “comply 
with all applicable federal, state and local laws and 
regulations concerning employment, including but not limited 
to: wage and hour, breaks and meal period regulations, the 
hiring and discharge of employees, Title VII and the FLSA.” 
(App. 56 ¶ 3(b).) Evidently, Tuesday Morning agreed that it 
bore many of the legal responsibilities of a traditional 
employer, including compliance with Title VII.  
 
 Even when confronted with stronger evidence against 
the purported employee, we have held that a rational jury 
could find the existence of a common-law employment 
relationship. In Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 
F.2d 1344, we considered whether a worker was ConRail’s 
employee for purposes of the Federal Employers’ Liability 
Act at the time he was injured in a workplace accident. As in 
the Title VII context, we looked to “the common law bases 
for creation of a master-servant relationship.” Id. at 1349. 
Penn Trucks, a subsidiary of ConRail, had a contract with 
ConRail to load and unload cargo at an intermodal freight 
terminal owned by ConRail. The contract “expressly removed 
from ConRail any authority to supervise or direct the manner 
in which Penn Trucks performed any of its services.” Id. at 
1352. And while ConRail clerks could “assign work to Penn 
Trucks employees and change assignments previously given 
them by Penn Trucks supervisors,” id. at 1350, “ConRail had 
delegated general responsibility for the operation of the 
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intermodal terminal to Penn Trucks” and “ConRail employees 
did not normally instruct Penn Trucks employees on the 
details of the work they were doing,” id. at 1351-52. The 
plaintiff, an employee of Penn Trucks working at the ConRail 
terminal, also “received his paycheck from Penn Trucks and 
took his orders from its employees,” and, on the day he was 
injured, he had been called to work by a dispatcher from Penn 
Trucks. Id. at 1346. Despite ConRail’s delegation of control 
for the operation of the intermodal terminal and the fact that 
the plaintiff was dispatched and paid by Penn Trucks, we 
nevertheless upheld a jury verdict against ConRail, largely 
because the plaintiff was acting under the direction of a 
ConRail inspector at the time of the accident. See id. at 1346-
47, 1351-52.  
 
 By the same logic, a rational jury could find that Faush 
was Tuesday Morning’s employee. Although he was paid and 
dispatched by Labor Ready, he worked under the direct 
supervision and control of Tuesday Morning managers who 
instructed the Labor Ready employees on the “details of the 
work they were doing.” See id. at 1352. Moreover, Labor 
Ready disclaimed responsibility for supervising the 
temporary employees’ work, and on the rare occasions that a 
Labor Ready supervisor visited the Tuesday Morning store, 
she acted as a mere conduit for instructions from the Tuesday 
Morning manager.  
 
 This particular constellation of Darden factors is not 
uncommon—it was also present in Linstead v. Chesapeake & 
Ohio Ry. Co., 276 U.S. 28 (1928). There, the Big Four 
Company had an arrangement with the Chesapeake & Ohio 
Railway Company (“C&O”) whereby Big Four lent C&O a 
locomotive, caboose, and train crew to operate freight trains 
along a stretch of C&O track in Kentucky and Ohio. This Big 
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Four crew was provided with C&O’s timetables and 
rulebooks and worked under the supervision of the C&O 
trainmaster. However, the crew was paid by Big Four and 
was not subject to discharge by any C&O officer.  
 Linstead was part of this Big Four train crew when he 
was killed in a railroad accident. His estate sued C&O under 
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Applying common-law 
principles, the Supreme Court held that Linstead was acting 
as C&O’s servant at the time of the accident. It based its 
conclusion on the fact that Linstead and his crew were 
performing work for C&O on C&O tracks and under the 
“immediate supervision and direction” of a C&O trainmaster. 
Id. at 34. Notably, the Court “d[id] not think that the fact that 
the Big Four [Rail]road paid the wages of Linstead and his 
crew, or that they could only be discharged or suspended by 
the Big Four, prevented their being the servants of [C&O] for 
the performance of this particular job.” Id.  
 
 Linstead underscores the error in granting summary 
judgment against Faush. Faush worked on Tuesday 
Morning’s premises under the immediate supervision and 
direction of Tuesday Morning personnel. Tuesday Morning’s 
extensive control over Faush’s activities could suffice to 
make him a common-law servant even though Labor Ready 
paid him and had the ultimate power to fire him. 
 
 We are mindful that many aspects of the Labor Ready-
Tuesday Morning employment arrangement that we have 
identified in combination as sufficient to survive summary 
judgment will pertain to a large number of temporary 
employment arrangements, with attendant potential liability 
under Title VII for the clients of those temporary employment 
agencies. We do not anticipate, however, that our holding 
today, which is limited to the Title VII context, will vastly 
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expand such liability, as entities with over fifteen employees 
are already subject to Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). In 
any event, given the broad remedial policies behind Title VII, 
Congress’s decision to use the term “employee” in its 
common law sense, and the Darden factors compel us to 
conclude that, on the facts here, a reasonable jury could find 
that Tuesday Morning was Faush’s joint employer and that 
summary judgment was therefore improper.   
 
 The decisions of our sister circuits concerning the 
status of temporary employees confirm this conclusion. In 
Maynard v. Kenova Chem. Co., 626 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1980), 
the Fourth Circuit held that a temporary worker supplied by a 
staffing firm to a chemical company was the latter’s common-
law employee. Id. at 360-62.8 And in Butler v. Drive 
Automotive Industries of America, Inc., No. 14-1348, 2015 
WL 4269615 (4th Cir. July 15, 2015), the same Court held in 
the Title VII context that both a staffing firm and its client 
were joint employers of a temporary employee assigned to 
work for the client. Id. at *9.9 Notably, in both cases, the 
                                              
8 Maynard predates Darden, but it does not predate the 
common law of agency. Although Maynard concerned the 
West Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Fourth 
Circuit applied the common law in finding that an 
employment relationship existed (and, therefore, that certain 
elements of the Act had been satisfied). See Maynard, 626 
F.2d at 361-62.  
9 As noted earlier, Butler applied a “hybrid” test for 
employment that purported to be more expansive than the 
common-law inquiry. The factors it discussed, however, are 
relevant under the common law as well, and it appears the 
outcome would have been the same under Darden, given that 
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Fourth Circuit found that an employment relationship existed 
as a matter of law on summary judgment. Here, we hold only 
that summary judgment should not have been granted.10 
 
 We find further support in the applicable guidance 
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”). According to the EEOC, “[a] client of a temporary 
employment agency typically qualifies as an employer of the 
temporary worker during the job assignment [for purposes of 
Title VII] . . . . because the client usually exercises significant 
                                                                                                     
Darden was the primary basis for the hybrid test. See Butler, 
2015 WL 4269615, at *5-9 & nn.11, 13.  
10 The First Circuit’s decision in Rivas v. Federacion de 
Asociaciones Pecuarias de Puerto Rico, 929 F.2d 814 (1st 
Cir. 1991), is not to the contrary. There, a ships’ agent 
provided work gangs of stevedores and foremen to the 
operator of a grain mill for the purpose of unloading cargo 
vessels. The ships’ agent was contractually obligated to 
supervise the laborers, and the grain mill operator’s 
“supervision of the gangs amounted to merely deciding which 
materials were to be unloaded first.” Id. at 821. Under these 
circumstances, it is unsurprising that the First Circuit held 
that the grain mill operator was not the laborers’ employer. 
See id.  
 
 We note, moreover, that the Seventh Circuit expressed 
doubt that the client of a temporary staffing firm would be 
able to avoid Title VII liability on the basis that it was not an 
employer, although it did not decide the question. See Porter 
v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 634 n.5 (7th Cir. 
2009). 
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supervisory control over the worker.” EEOC Notice 915.002, 
Enforcement Guidance: Application of EEO Laws to 
Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment 
Agencies and Other Staffing Firms, Dec. 3, 1997, 1997 WL 
33159161, at *5-6. Although “the EEOC’s Compliance 
Manual [and enforcement guidance] is not controlling[,] . . . it 
may constitute a ‘body of experience and informed judgment’ 
to which we may resort for guidance.” Clackamas, 538 U.S. 
at 449 n.9 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944)).11 
 
 In sum, the weight of authority, in conjunction with the 
evidence presented to the District Court, compels the 
conclusion that Faush survives summary judgment on his 
Title VII and Human Relations Act claims.  
 
                                              
11 For example, in evaluating whether a shareholder-director 
was an “employee” for purposes of federal antidiscrimination 
statutes, the Supreme Court adopted the factors identified by 
the EEOC, as they were consistent with the “common-law 
touchstone of control.” Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449. The 
EEOC’s guidance concerning temporary employees is 
persuasive for the same reason—indeed, it mirrors the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the circumstances under which 
servants who perform work for the benefit of a master other 
than their own become that master’s servants. Compare 
EEOC Notice 915.002, 1997 WL 33159161, at *5-6, with 
Linstead, 276 U.S. at 33-34 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. 
Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 221-22 (1909)). 
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B. Section 1981 
 
 Faush’s § 1981 claim, by contrast, was properly 
dismissed. “Section 1981 offers relief when racial 
discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual 
relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an 
existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has 
or would have rights under the existing or proposed 
contractual relationship.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 
546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006).  
 
 While it is true that the substantive elements of a § 
1981 claim mirror those of a Title VII claim in many respects, 
see Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 267 
(3d Cir. 2010), the types of individuals who can bring such 
claims are not identical. Section 1981 “‘does not limit itself, 
or even refer, to employment contracts.’” Brown, 581 F.3d at 
181 (quoting Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 
8, 14 (1st Cir. 1999)). As a result, “an independent contractor 
may bring a cause of action under section 1981 for 
discrimination occurring within the scope of the independent 
contractor relationship.” Id.12 
 
 Faush cannot avoid summary judgment on his § 1981 
claim, however, “unless he has (or would have) rights under 
the existing (or proposed) contract that he wishes ‘to make 
                                              
12 For this reason, it is incorrect to suggest that a § 1981 claim 
necessarily “‘suffers the same fate’” as a Title VII claim 
dismissed for lack of an employment relationship. Faush v. 
Tuesday Morning, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 350, 356 (E.D. Pa. 
2014) (quoting Holtzman v. The World Book Co., 174 F. 
Supp. 2d 251, 258 (E.D. Pa. 2001)).  
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and enforce.’” McDonald, 546 U.S. at 479-80 (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 1981). Faush does not argue that he meets this 
standard. Moreover, as the District Court recognized, the 
record does not indicate that Faush entered into a contract 
with Tuesday Morning or ever attempted to do so.13 The grant 
of summary judgment on Faush’s § 1981 claim was therefore 
appropriate.  
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s judgment with respect to Faush’s Title VII and 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act claims and remand for 
                                              
13 Faush may be a third-party intended beneficiary of certain 
portions of the Agreement between Labor Ready and Tuesday 
Morning. The Supreme Court has not ruled out the possibility 
that such a beneficiary may have rights under § 1981. See 
McDonald, 546 U.S. at 476 n.3. As Faush does not make this 
argument, however, this is not the appropriate case to explore 
that possibility.  
 
 The fact that temporary employees may not have any 
remedy for racial discrimination under § 1981—and that any 
such remedy, if it exists, would be contingent on the terms of 
a contract negotiated by the staffing firm and its client—
demonstrates the perversity of exempting the clients of 
staffing firms from Title VII. Traditional employees are 
covered by Title VII, and many independent contractors will 
be able to avail themselves of § 1981. There is no reason to 
believe Congress intended for temporary employees to fall 
through the cracks and be subjected to limitless 
discrimination at their places of work.  
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further proceedings. We will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment with respect to Faush’s § 1981 claim.  
